Operation Valuable Fiend Read online

BGBRAWL Cryptonym for Egypt

  BGFIEND Cryptonym for the OPC Albanian operation between 1949 and 1952

  BGGYPSY Cryptonym for Communist

  BGSPEED Cryptonym for the operation to purchase and outfit a vessel in the Mediterranean to be used for broadcasting black propaganda into Albania

  CHARITY Cryptonym for the intelligence-gathering operation in northern Albania financed by the OSO and run by Italian Navy Intelligence between 1949–1952

  DECADAL Cryptonym for Xhafer Deva

  FONTANA Cryptonym for the intelligence-gathering operation in southern Albania financed by the OSO and run by Italian Navy Intelligence in 1949

  HBBASIS Cryptonym for the covert site in Germany where the OPC trained Albanian and Bulgarian agents for infiltration missions in 1950 and 1951

  HBPIXIE Cryptonym for Albania. “Pixieland” referred to Albania, and “Pixies” to Albanians

  HTGRUBBY Cryptonym for clandestine radio station Voice of Free Albania

  HTNEIGH Cryptonym for the National Committee for Free Albania

  JBALERT Cryptonym for the US Air Force

  JBPARSON Cryptonym for the operation that maintained about two hundred Albanians as potential reserve for armed operations under the cover of Labor Company 4000 near Frankfurt, Germany

  KMWAHOO Cryptonym for Albania or Albanian. “Wahoos” referred to Albanians

  LAWBOOK Cryptonym for the operation to parachute Kosovar followers of Xhafer Deva in northern Albania financed by the OSO and run by Italian Navy Intelligence between 1949–1952

  LCBATLAND Cryptonym for Albania

  LCDRINK Cryptonym for Greece

  Malament, Henry R. Pseudonym for Hasan Dosti

  Murat, Nelson J. Pseudonym for Enver Hoxha

  OBDURATE Cryptonym for the operation to control BKI elements in Rome

  OBHUNT Cryptonym for the operation that sponsored infiltration of agent teams in Albania

  OBLIVIOUS Cryptonym for the operation that provided support and guidance to the NCFA

  OBOPUS Cryptonym for the CIA Albanian operation that replaced BGFIEND in 1952

  OBSIDIOUS Cryptonym for the operation that sponsored the infiltration of agent teams in Albania between 1954 and 1956

  OBSTACLE Cryptonym for the operation to control BKI elements in Rome between 1952 and 1954

  OBTEST Cryptonym for the operation to run the clandestine radio station Voice of Free Albania

  Pilgrim Pseudonym for Frank Wisner

  QKPALING Cryptonym for NCFA newspaper Shqipëria

  QKSTAIR Cryptonym for the operation against Bulgaria that the OPC launched in early 1950

  RNCASTING Cryptonym for King Zog

  RNLUMPIT Cryptonym for Archibald Lyall

  RNPUTLOG Cryptonym for Hamit Matiani

  TPROACH Cryptonym for Yugoslavia

  VALUABLE Cryptonym for British SIS Albanian operation between 1949 and 1953

  XNMALEDICT Cryptonym for Balli Kombëtar Agrarian

  Yarborough Pseudonym for King Zog

  ZRMETAL Cryptonym for Washington, DC

  Note on the Pronunciation of Albanian Names

  In order to maintain the accuracy and authenticity of the story, I have used the Albanian language representation for names of Albanian characters or geographical locations in Albania. The pronunciation of Albanian is phonetical and comes quite naturally to English speakers once they learn the thirty-six basic Albanian sounds, which also make up the letters of the Albanian alphabet. The list below contains the letters of the Albanian alphabet, their corresponding English sounds, and a pronunciation example.

  Letter Sound Pronunciation Example

  A, a a tar

  B, b b boy

  C, c rats

  Ç, ç church

  D, d d door

  Dh, dh ð the

  E, e ε end

  Ë, ë ə murder

  F, f f fast

  G g gum

  Gj, gj Ɉ join

  H, h h hat

  I, i i tee

  J j yes

  K, k k kit

  L, l l lost

  Ll, ll ɫ ball

  M, m m mom

  N, n n no

  Nj, nj ɲ El Niño

  O, o o open

  P, p p pot

  Q, q suture

  R, r ɾ rope

  Rr, rr R barrel

  S, s s song

  Sh, sh ʃ sharp

  T, t t ten

  Th, th θ thick

  U, u u foot

  V, v v van

  X, x Godzilla

  Xh, xh John

  Y, y y déjà vu

  Z, z z zoom

  Zh, zh ʒ treasure

  Here are the pronunciations for some of the names that appear in this story:

  Enver Hoxha: Enver Hoja

  Koçi Xoxe: Kotchi Dzodze

  Abas Kupi: Ah-bas Koopee

  Abas Ermenji: Ah-bas Ermeñee

  Tahir Premçi: Ta-heer Pram-tshi

  Halil Branica: Haleel Branitsa

  Ismail Vërlaci: Ees-mah-eel Ver-la-tsi

  Operation Valuable Fiend

  Albania circa 1950

  Prologue

  In late afternoon on November 11, 1950, a rickety truck pulled up next to a Douglas C-47 Skytrain airplane parked on the tarmac of a small military airstrip located twelve miles northwest of Athens, Greece. The plane was all black and lacked any insignia or identification numbers on its body. Nine men jumped from the truck, unloaded seven bundles, and then climbed aboard the C-47 with the help of the pilot and four members of the crew, all veterans of the pre–World War II Polish Air Force contracted by the Central Intelligence Agency to fly dangerous covert missions over denied areas in the Balkans.

  The men were in their early thirties and dressed alike in clothes made of military-grade material, but without distinguishing marks that would identify them with any known military force. They were suited up to survive in rugged terrain and cold weather. Each man wore a leather helmet on his head, a scarf tied around his neck, a shirt and a wool sweater under a snow jacket, heavy trousers over long underwear, socks, boots, and gloves. Each man had a German Schmeisser submachine gun strapped to his chest, three magazines of ammunition attached to the belt, together with a Walther P38 pistol and magazine, commando knife, jackknife, map, compass, and flashlight. Each man carried $100 to $150 worth of local currency and forty gold napoleons in money belts under the layers of clothes.1

  The nine men were the first team of paramilitary agents that the CIA was parachuting into Albania. Four of them would operate in the Kukësi region in the northeast mountains of Albanian near the Yugoslav border. The other five would be parachuted into the mountains of Martaneshi farther south. Their mission was to represent the National Committee for Free Albania among the population, to give hope to their countrymen that the day of liberation from the Communists was approaching fast, to collect information about the situation in the country, and to stay in touch with their case officer in Athens in order to receive more supplies and additional agents. Even though they were on a reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering mission, the men knew they were going against ruthless enemies who would show no mercy if they captured them. A thin glass ampule containing liquid potassium cyanide, known as an L-pill, was sewn into the collar of the snow jacket in such a way that the man wearing the jacket could reach down and bite on the ampule even with his hands tied behind his back. Death would follow in ten to fifteen seconds and would save the agents from the horrendous tortures that awaited them if the enemy captured them alive.2

  The plane took off from the airstrip at 1940 hours. It headed west over the Gulf of Corinth, turned north by northwest over the Ionian Sea, and flew along the Greek coast past the island of Corfu. When it reached the Straits of Otranto, it banked to the right and followed a northerly course parallel with the Albanian coastline. It entered Albania at 2227 hours at the junction of the Yugoslav border and the sea at the southern extremity of Buna River valley, south of Shkodra. There, the plane turne
d onto a northeasterly course, flying in a straight line until its path intersected with the Drini i Zi River.

  The navigator tried his best to orient himself using landmarks, especially riverbeds in the narrow valleys below. But it was a moonless night, and in the complete darkness ground checkpoints were unrecognizable. “A matter of black sameness and all streams looked alike,” the crew would report when they returned to Athens.3

  They reached the target zone for the first drop near Kukësi at 2251. There was no one on the ground to signal, so the plane circled the area for approximately one hour with the navigator unable to find the precise drop point. The Kukësi team conferred with the pilot, who assured them that at least they were not over Yugoslavia. Not wanting to abort the mission, the men decided to go. Four men and three bundles parachuted in a single run at 2350.

  After the drop, the plane set on a southerly course and headed to the second target in the mountains of Martaneshi. The navigator was not able to recognize the drop zone there either, making it necessary to circle the general area for nearly an hour. Finally, he spotted a suitable clearing and at 0045 the party of five jumped from 1,200 feet above the ground. The plane circled back and discharged four bundles of equipment. Then, it set its course west in a line north of Tirana and Durrësi straight out to sea. It departed the Albanian coast at 0150 and landed in Greece at 0345 hours. Total time of flight was eight hours ten minutes. Total time over Albania: three hours twenty-three minutes.4

  * * *

  Upon their return to Athens, the Polish aircrew reported no flares, no antiaircraft fire, no interception attempts, and seemingly no detection. The morale of the drop parties had been especially high. Their physical condition was good—the flight had been in smooth air and no one became airsick. During the journey, the nine men displayed normal curiosity about ground scenery below and a nervous excitement when the aircrew fastened the static lines and opened the cabin door. In the case of both drops, the jumpmaster pushed the leader of each team through the door to get things going—the rest followed very quickly. Any momentary balking was purely an instinctive reaction. The richly experienced aircrew was generally satisfied with the whole operation.5

  News of the successful parachute drop reached Washington the next day and caused a great deal of enthusiasm in the hierarchy in the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) at the CIA. The OPC was one of the youngest and most activist components of the United States intelligence community at the time, in charge, despite its innocuous name, of aggressive actions to combat Communism and to counteract the “vicious covert activities of the USSR.”6

  The drop of November 11, 1950, was the first paramilitary action of Project Fiend, the OPC’s ambitious operation aimed at breaking the weakest link in the chain of Soviet satellites, Communist Albania.

  CHAPTER 1

  The Office of Policy Coordination

  On July 26, 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act, which laid the foundations of the modern national security establishment, based on the experience gained during World War II and the challenges presented by the intensifying Cold War. It created the National Security Council (NSC) to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies; established the office of the secretary of Defense, led by a civilian presidential appointee to coordinate the activities of the separate Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force; and instituted a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) organization responsible for the unified strategic direction, command, and integration of land, naval, and air forces. It also created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the first peacetime coordinated and comprehensive intelligence service in the nation’s history.1 As the Congress wrote the National Security Act initially, the CIA’s mandate was very similar to that of its predecessor, the Central Intelligence Group, which President Truman had created in January 1946 by presidential directive. The CIA’s mission was to collect intelligence by secret or overt means, perform research and analysis, and produce intelligence summaries and estimates.2

  The first few months of the CIA’s existence coincided with an escalation of Communist activities throughout the world and particularly in Europe. The Soviet Union leveraged both the good will created by its fight against the Nazis during the war and the presence of its armies in a number of European countries after the war to inspire and support local Communist parties by open means or behind the scenes. In Czechoslovakia, the Communists had won only 38 percent of the votes in the 1947 elections and held a minority position in the government and parliament. But they controlled the police, security apparatus, and armed forces, which they used to engineer a coup in February of 1948. A government purged of non-Communists came to power, and the parliament quickly approved a new constitution proclaiming Czechoslovakia a People’s Democracy, effectively placing it in the Soviet orbit.

  A similar scenario risked being repeated in Italy, which had scheduled parliamentary elections for April 18, 1948. The Italian Communist Party, the strongest Communist party in Europe outside the Soviet Union, had outperformed the Christian Democrats in municipal elections in 1946 and 1947. Supported by millions of dollars funneled “in black bags of money directly out of the Soviet compound in Rome,”3 they were poised to win the parliamentary elections. Almost forty years later, Gianni Agnelli, the Italian industrial mogul and head of the Fiat conglomerate, described the effects of a Communist electoral victory in Italy as follows: “[It] would have been a tragedy for Italy; . . . would have been a tragedy for Europe; . . . would have been a tragedy for the Mediterranean; and it would have been a setback for America.”4

  The United States took a number of steps to ensure a favorable outcome of the elections. Significant economic and military aid available under the Marshall Plan was directed to Italy; the large Italian-American community in the United States sent millions of letters, postcards, and telegrams urging their friends and family back home to reject the Communists. The Voice of America and commercial radio stations in Italy broadcast hours of programming designed to influence the vote, with the Voice of America featuring prominent personalities like Frank Sinatra and Gary Cooper to pitch their message.

  However, there was a need to act more decisively with direct but clandestine support that would help the Christian Democrats and their coalition partners get over the top. The CIA’s Office of Special Operations (OSO) was the natural choice for the job. The OSO was the intelligence-gathering arm of the CIA that controlled the overwhelming majority of the agency’s personnel and assets at the time. Most of the OSO officers had learned their tradecraft during World War II, serving in military intelligence units or in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), created by William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan in 1942 to collect intelligence and conduct sabotage operations against Axis targets in Europe and parts of Asia.

  James Angleton, the OSO station chief in Rome, took charge of the CIA operation to influence the Italian election. Angleton had been instrumental in rebuilding the Italian intelligence services after the war and had unfettered access to their hierarchies, which he used to channel all available OSO assets toward supporting the Christian Democratic candidates and their allies. F. Mark Wyatt, a young CIA officer assigned to the operation recalled:

  We had bags of money that we delivered to selected politicians, to defray their political expenses, their campaign expenses, for posters, for pamphlets, what have you. And we did many things to assist those selected Christian Democrats, Republicans, and the other parties that were completely reliable—that could keep the secret of where their funds came from.

  We would like to have done this in a more sophisticated manner. Passing black bags to affect a political election is not really a terribly attractive thing. But we only had a few months to do this, and that was the principal thing that we did.5

  In the end, Alcide De Gasperi’s Christian Democrats and their coalition partners were able to beat Palmiro Togliatti’s Communist-Socialist alliance thanks to the strong anti-Communist get-out-the-vote effor
t supported by the Catholic Church and financed by the CIA.

  * * *

  The legal cover for the CIA’s conduct of the Italian operation had been provided by NSC directive 4-A of December 17, 1947, which directed the director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to “Initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security.”6

  An increasing number of people in the national security establishment came to the realization that countering the Soviet threat in a cold war required a broader spectrum of covert actions, more than just psychological operations like those undertaken to influence the outcome of the Italian elections. NSC directive 10/2 of June 18, 1948, authorized the CIA to conduct broad covert rather than merely psychological operations, defining them as:

  All activities . . . which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.

  Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti–sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.7

  The Office of Policy Coordination was created on September 1, 1948, to organize and manage these covert operations. As envisioned by NSC 10/2, the OPC took direction from the State Department in peacetime and from the military in wartime. The OPC was placed organizationally under the CIA “for housekeeping and logistics only [italics in original].”8 It had a direct line reporting and access to the State Department and military hierarchies, with only a “dotted line” dependency on the director of Central Intelligence, who was Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, rear admiral, US Navy.